A couple of years ago, some "diplomatic and military observer" published the following text on a Chinese military news site. Parts of that text have been translated and could serve as some kind of an expert comment about Hamas using "Ghaza Underground" to fight Israeli incursions into the densely populated Palestinian settlements of Ghaza:
揭秘加沙特色的地道战：哈马斯令以军损失惨重
Uncovering the unique tunnel warfare in Ghaza:
Hamas caused heavy losses to the Israeli army.
In this battle, Hamas's armed resistance actions featuring "tunnel warfare" were talked about by all parties because of their special tactics and outstanding results: not only Hamas repeatedly broadcast news of sneak attacks on Israeli troops through tunnels , the Israeli army itself has made destroying Hamas tunnels its top priority. In China, the media's constant exaggeration and the lasting influence of the classic military-education film "Tunnel Warfare" made it regarded as a "good recipe" for Hamas to defeat the enemy.
In Palestine, which is full of deserts, the elusive tunnel warfare of Hamas has some similarities and more differences with its distant Chinese cousin, the Ranzhuang tunnel warfare. What are Hamas's tunnels and tunnel warfare like? This has to start with the blockade of Ghaza.
As a traditional human construction project, tunnels have played a significant role in war. In military history, tunnels have played various roles: During the Anti-Japanese War, the Ranzhuang Tunnel in the North China Plain provided shelter for villagers when the Japanese and puppet troops invaded; during the Vietnam War, thousands of people's troops lived, marched and even fought in hidden tunnels; To this day, the Syrian opposition continues to destroy fortresses by digging tunnels and planting explosives beneath enemy positions. In Gaza, the two most important types of tunnels are the most basic traffic tunnels.
Gaza faces the sea on one side and borders Egypt and Israel on land. After Hamas gained full management rights over Ghaza in 2007, Israel completely blocked Ghaza and carried out intermittently shelling and "targeted killing" operations in Ghaza; Egypt also nominally closed the border between Egypt and Ghaza.
Ghaza was obviously unable to support itself with only a small amount of humanitarian aid, so it started a large-scale tunnel smuggling business. In the first quarter of 2013, the tunnels provided Ghaza with 65% of its flour, 67% of its consumer goods, 98% of its sugar, and 100% of its steel and cement. It also provided Hamas with important weapons and financial support - to 800 militants annually. The taxes levied by many smuggling tunnels are equivalent to 40% of Hamas's fiscal revenue. Firearms, ammunition, rocket launcher parts and even anti-tank missiles and other weapons continue to flow into Hamas's armed forces, greatly enhancing its strength.
Most of these smuggling tunnels lead to Egypt, and a few extend into Israel. The tunnels are usually wide and sturdy, and can generally accommodate two people or one person and a cart. Large ones can even pass small cars. The tunnels are reinforced with steel beams, reinforced concrete prefabricated panels or cement hollow bricks to prevent collapse or bombing. Due to the actual connivance of the Egyptian government, most of the tunnels leading to Egypt are semi-open, while the smuggling tunnels leading to Israel are strictly covered both at the entrance and exit.
Coexisting with smuggling tunnels are military tunnels. At present, it seems that such tunnels were dug by Hamas specifically for sneak attacks on Israeli troops. This kind of tunnel is smaller in size and is reinforced with cement boards, but the exit can only accommodate a single person crawling. Even close to the entrance, the tunnel is still several meters deep, and the entrance is carefully camouflaged. Such tunnels usually penetrate deep into Israel, and after the Israeli army attacked Gaza, they became Hamas' main means of harassing the Israeli army's rear areas.
No matter what kind of tunnel, it is very expensive and expensive to build. It is dangerous to dig tunnels in places where there is a lack of geological exploration and safety equipment. Many young people have died in landslides during the 12 hours of tunnel excavation every day. Normally, a tunnel consumes 350 tons of concrete, and the excavation cost for an average tunnel of 700 meters is as high as US$250,000. A tunnel to Israel or Egypt costs millions of dollars. This is why many tunnel diggers joke about having millions (assets) but not even a million dollars in cash.
Unlike the one-time blast tunnels that frequently appear on the Syrian battlefield and are specially used for government forces to fly "earth planes", most Ghaza tunnels can now be used repeatedly as long as they are used properly (Before 2012, Hamas tried to use them repeatedly. Blasting tunnels to blow up Israeli military outposts, but this type of tunnel excavation is expensive, easy to be discovered by the Israeli army and can only be used once, so it was gradually abandoned by Hamas). Through these tunnels, Hamas penetrates into Israeli military positions or behind frontline troops in teams of less than 10 people, and launches sneak attacks on Israeli military posts or small groups of troops in areas far away from tunnel entrances.
The Ghaza border is long and the Israeli army is short of troops. It can only ensure that there are sufficient troops at the front and only a few people are stationed at the rear post. The fast-moving Hamas team can easily succeed and evacuate from the tunnel before Israeli reinforcements arrive. Even if the sneak attack fails and the assault team is annihilated, as long as they are not in a position to enter the tunnel, the tunnel will not be easily exposed. In order to solve this problem, the Israeli army recruited a large number of reserves and tried to protect these rear strongholds by increasing the density of troops and the number of patrols. Unexpectedly, this move actually increased the probability of Israeli casualties.
In the past few years, with the continuous expansion of the smuggling tunnel business, Hamas, which has become richer in financial resources, has begun to reflect on its combat experience in resisting Israeli invasions and strengthened its armed forces in a targeted manner. An important step is to equip portable anti-tank missiles on a large scale. As Libya, Egypt, Syria and other countries fell into civil strife, a large number of weapons, including anti-tank missiles, were dispersed into the arms market. Together with the imitation Soviet-made anti-tank missiles purchased from North Korea, Hamas's anti-tank strength has greatly increased. .
Although these 1970s-era missiles are incapable of destroying the heavy armored vehicles and main battle tanks of the Israeli frontline troops in a direct confrontation, they have a unique opportunity in the face of the called-up reserves: the old M113 armored vehicles for the reserves can only defend themselves against attacks from old-style rocket launchers and are powerless against anti-tank missiles. Hamas can launch missiles relatively covertly from one kilometer away, and as long as they hit, they can cause "mass casualties." Compared with rocket launchers that are not powerful enough and have to get as close as 100 to 200 meters, yet only hitting by luck, anti-tank missiles have become a "nightmare" for the Israeli army.
This tactic is generally the same as that of the Lebanese Hezbollah. In 2009, Hezbollah used 500 anti-tank missiles to destroy more than 50 Israeli tanks and armored vehicles, causing the Israeli army to pay huge casualties.
Another use of tunnels by Hamas is to conceal rocket launch sites. Among the Hamas tunnels discovered by the Israeli army, one had four rocket launchers installed at the entrance of the tunnel. Not only is such way of launching more concealed, it can also increase the range of the rocket with the help of tunnels. - Half of the indigenous rockets of poor quality land on Ghaza's own territory due to their insufficient range. Moving the launch site underground to Israel will increase the rocket's probability of reaching Israeli territory to 100%. Because the ballistic trajectories of Turkish rockets are unstable, it is difficult for the Israeli military to accurately determine the location of these launch positions and attack them.
Of course, these two tactics are not enough to stop or even contain the Israeli army. They only make the Israeli army pay a higher price and bear greater domestic pressure. Judging from the fact that the Israeli military has shifted its focus to attacking tunnels, this kind of attack is still effective.
Tonight in Egypt Algeria Canada Belgium
[Thousands are shouting their motto]
"The People of Jordan demand a border opening"
Demonstration of pro-Palestinian activists in Amman, Jordan, demanding the opening
of the Rafah border crossing to Egypt in southern Ghaza to enable the entrance of aid
delivery into Ghaza. The people of Jordan comprises 98% Arabs, including 370,000
Palestinians who are living in UNRWA refugee camps after having to flee from Israel.
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